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What has mechanized reasoning achieved?
The four color map problem
1852: Francis Guthrie stumps de Morgan, who adopts the problem
1879: Alfred Kempe proposes proof; the Royal Society only
discovers its errors a decade later
1976: assembly language code written to ‘prove’ result [AH77;
AHK77]
graph theory identifies
1 reducible configurations
2 a set of < 2,000 minimal possible counter-examples
computer searches over these minimal examples
impossible to hand-check the whole proof (over 400 pages), minor
errors surfaced [AH89, p.23], doubts remained
[Gon08]: formalized whole proof as a program for evaluation in
Coq proof system
HOL:ITP 3/36
What has mechanized reasoning achieved?
Robbins problem: bases for Boolean algebras
Robbins (1930s): for any Boolean algebra, are the following
equivalent:
(HUN) X ∨ Y ∨ X ∨ Y = X
(ROB) X ∨ Y ∨ X ∨ Y = X
trivial with single atom, E = {a}, so that X ,Y ∈ {0,1}, but . . .
question came at a period of intense interest in the axiomatic
foundations of logic
beguilingly simple, but open question for 60 years, and favorite of
Tarski [HMT71, p.245]
little intuition: only example of Robbins algebra was also Boolean
[McC97] at Argonne exploits Winker’s sufficient conditions
automated first order logic solver, EQP, generates proof in 8 days,
using 30MB memory
17 step proof, after trying 17,666 (complex) steps; humans can
check it
fine-tuning produces an 8 step proof in 5 days
FOL:ATP 4/36
What has mechanized reasoning achieved?
Stacking cannon balls: the Kepler conjecture
1611: Kepler conjectures that
face-centred cubic packing of spheres
achieves maximum density
1900: Hilbert includes it in problem 18 of
his 23 unsolved problems
1953: Tóth proves that finitely many
calculations could check all cases
(http://tinyurl.com/3bxx2t)
Hales implements Tóth, minimizing an 150 variable function for
5,000 cases
solved 100,000 linear programming problems
[Hal05]: submitted in 1998; by 2003, 12 referees were “99%
certain” was correct, but “will not be able to certify it . . . because
they have run out of energy to devote to the problem”
2003: Hales launches Project FlysPecK, using prover HOL Light,
to formally prove; expected to take 20 years
HOL:ITP 5/36
What has mechanized reasoning achieved?
Hardware, software verification: 4,195,8353,145,727 ≈ 1.33374?
Pentium floating point division bug (1994): worst
known relative error 0.006%; few affected, but
costs Intel $475mn
destruction of Ariane 5 Flight 501 (1996): 64-bit
floating point value converted to 16-bit signed
integer value
X
X ∨ Y
Y
1 model hardware, software systems as logical
2 prove theorem for each IEEE property to be implemented
e.g. sufficient condition for perfect square root rounding is∣∣∣√a − s∗∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣√a −m∣∣∣∀a ∈ R
where algorithm returns s∗, m is the midpoint between the bounding
floats [Har06]
3 model checking at ATP end of spectrum, more common; theorem
proving at ITP end, less common [Woo+09]
model checking 6/36
What has mechanized reasoning achieved?
Eureqa: deducing Newton’s laws [SL09]?
Distilling Free-Form Natural Laws from Experimental Data (YouTube
video)
We’re going to see scientific results that are correct, that are
predictive, but are without explanation. We may be able to do
science without insight, and we may have to learn to live without it.
Science will still progress, but computers will tell us things that are
true, and we won’t understand them. (Steven Strogatz, 2010, NYT)
machine learning 7/36
What has mechanized reasoning achieved?
Watson beats the humans on Jeopardy
IBM’s Watson supercomputer destroys all humans in Jeopardy
(YouTube video)
probabilistic expert system capable of
natural language reasoning
case-based reasoning (q.v. [GS01])
v. Deep Blue: broad knowledge rather than narrowly specialized
now signed up with Citigroup
machine learning + expert system 8/36
Uses in economics
How can mechanized reasoning help economics?
When possible, shall illustrate with Arrow’s impossibility theorem:
F formal representation and retrieval
searching for a2 + b2 = c2 finds x2 = y2 + z2
[KMP12]
H makes hidden assumptions explicit
[Gea01; Gea05; Nip09]
∃ confirms existing results
C cleans up proofs
S suggests new proof strategies
N helps find new results (inc. new types of results)
[TL09; GE11]
R helps review work
[KRW11]
9/36
Uses in economics
A checklist
1 a tractable problem
are there a finite number of finite cases to consider (maybe with an
induction step)?
n.b. [CHH02]: Deep Blue v. Kasparov in 1997 usually searched
6 − 16 ply deep, with max 40 ply
2 an appropriate logic (and calculus) for handling your conjectures
1 provers don’t compromise on soundness
if it is deduced, it is a property: (Γ ` ϕ) then (Γ |= ϕ)
trivial soundness: “on the advice of counsel, I respectfully assert . . . ”
2 expressiveness: must be able to formulate all relevant properties
3 completeness: any question asked can, in principle, be answered
by skillful use of the logic’s calculus
if it is a property, it can be deduced: (Γ |= ϕ) then (Γ ` ϕ)
4 decidable: if an answer exists, there is an algorithm for deriving it
art: trading off expressiveness, completeness and decidability
3 a solver that efficiently implements the calculus
10/36
Uses in economics
A brief word on classical logics
propositional: concrete, finite statements
“Ken is a dictator over pair {SITE, ICE}”
sound, complete, decidable
not expressive
Chaff; [TL09]
first order: propositional + quantification (∀,∃) over objects
“there exists a dictator, n, over any pair {a,b}”
sound, complete, more expressive (Gödel completeness)
not decidable
Prover9, Vampire, Prolog; [GE09]
higher order: FOL + quantification over functions, predicates
“if n is an X over {a,b} then n is an X over all pairs”
sound, very expressive
not complete (Gödel incompleteness) or decidable
HOL Light, Isabelle; [Har06]
(n.b. FOL + set theory replicates HOL
uses sets to define functions, predicates; e.g. Mizar; [Wie09])
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Uses in economics
Caveat
the expectation was that these advances [in automated
reasoning] would also have significant impact on the practice
of doing mathematics. However, so far, this impact is small.
We think that the reason for this is the fact that automated
reasoning so far concentrated on the automated proof of
individual theorems whereas, in the practice of mathematics,
one proceeds by building up entire theories in a step-by-step
process. This process of exploring mathematical theories
consists of the invention of notions, the invention and proof of
propositions (lemmas, theorems), the invention of problems,
and the invention and verification of methods (algorithms) that
solve problems. [Buc06]
12/36
Uses in economics Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
A constitution respects UN if society puts alternative a strictly
above b whenever every individual puts a strictly above b.
The constitution respects IIA if the social relative ranking
(higher, lower, or indifferent) of two alternatives a and b
depends only on their relative ranking by every individual.
The constitution is a D by individual n if for every pair a and b,
society strictly prefers a to b whenever n strictly prefers a to
b. [Gea05]
Theorem (Arrow [Gea05])
(For two or more agents, and three or more alternatives,) any
constitution that respects transitivity, IIA, and UN is a D.
13/36
Uses in economics Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Social choice theory turns out to be perfectly suitable for
mechanical theorem proving. . . . However, it is unclear if this
will lead to new insights into either social choice theory or
theorem proving. [Nip09]
we form an interesting conjecture and then prove it using the
same [mechanized] techniques as in the previous proofs.
. . . the newly proved theorem . . . subsumes both Arrow’s and
Wilson’s theorems. [TL09]
When applied to a space of 20 principles for preference
extension familiar from the literature, this method yields a
total of 84 impossibility theorems, including both known and
nontrivial new results. [GE11]
14/36
Uses in economics Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Geanakoplos’ three brief proofs
1st 3rd
hand 1 page 1 page
Isabelle [Nip09] 350 lines (6 pages) 300 lines
Mizar [Wie07; Wie09] 1100 lines
Geanakoplos’ proofs [Nip09]
1st proof [Gea01; Nip09]
statement in extremal lemma required 20 line auxiliary proof
equation of pivotal and dictator only hinted at originally
3rd proof [Gea01; Nip09]
pairwise neutrality lemma mentions two profiles not explicitly
considered
minor missing case in pairwise neutrality lemma
therefore, could not formalize proof
Nipkow e-mails Geanakoplos in 2002; both proofs revised in [Gea05]
H, ∃, C, HOL:ITP, FOL+SET 15/36
Uses in economics Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Restating Arrow’s theorem [GE09]
surprised that could mostly formalize Arrow in FOL, as TARROW
quantification over preference profiles feels second order
Theorem (Arrow à la [GE09])
TARROW has no finite models.
∴ no counterexamples to TARROW for finite # of agents, alternatives
We designed a step-by-step proof . . . for 2 individuals and 3
alternatives . . . At each step we received a negative
response, with the prover exceeding the search space limits
or not providing an answer in a reasonable amount of time.
prover seemed unable to apply “permutation, guessing the correct
sequence of swaps to get from a profile to another”
an automated proof exists as FOL is complete, but “for every finite
number of individuals there is a (possibly different) first-order
proof”
S, FOL 16/36
Uses in economics Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Inducing Arrow from 2 agents, 3 alternatives [TL09]
manually: prove induction from 2 agent, 3 alternative base case
[Suz00]: induction proof from 2 agent, n alternative base case
1 constraint satisfaction problem
not feasible to generate all 636 ≈ 1028 SWF on the base case
find all SWF satisfying U and IIA, and verify are D
CSP: 〈X ,D,C〉, where
X is set of variables (36 = 6 × 6 preference profiles)
D is their domain (6 linear orderings for each profile)
C is the constraint set (U and IIA)
Prolog code: finds 2 dictatorial SWF in < 1 second on desktop
2 Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT) ⊂ CSP
express clauses of Boolean variables in conjunctive normal form
(x ∨ y ∨ z) ∧ (¬x ∨ ¬y ∨ z) ∧ (y ∨ ¬y) ∧ · · ·
encoded base case in 35,973 variables in 106,354 clauses
situation calculus: swap action augments propositional logic to
permutate profiles encoding axioms
Chaff2 SAT solver shows inconsistency, < 1 second on desktop
SAT solver: theorem prover in propositional logic∃, S, PROP, FOL 17/36
Uses in economics Arrow’s impossibility theorem
New theorem generalizes Arrow’s, Wilson’s
only 94 of 636 base case SWFs satisfy IIA
their inspection establishes the base case for a new theorem
Theorem ([TL09])
If a social welfare function W on (N,A) satisfies IIA, then for every
subset Y of A such that ‖Y‖ = 3,
1 WY is dictatorial, or
2 WY is inversely dictatorial, or
3 The range of WY has at most 2 elements, whose [Kendall tau]
distance is at most 1.
a new induction lemma then establishes the theorem
N, PROP 18/36
Uses in economics Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Ranking sets of objects [KP84; BBP04]
[GE11]: instead of an induction lemma per base case, a broadly
applicable induction theorem for ranking sets of objects
many-sorted logic for set preferences (MSLSP), a first order logic,
allows separate quantification over elements, sets
using 20 known axioms [BBP04], use SAT solver to generate 84
impossibility theorems from c.1mn combinations
1 yields new theorems
2 strengthens existing theorems
3 aids understanding of axioms’ role
first [?] impossibility result without either GF or SDom
LIN appears in all theorems; evenExt, REFL occur in none; intIND
occur in all for 7 or 8 choice items, and never for fewer than 5
4 establishes suspected results
[BPX00] SDom, IND, SUAv and STopMon characterize the min-max
ordering
[Arl03] n = 5 counter-example: min-max ordering violates IND
[GE11] impossibility with ≥ 4 choice items, including manual proof
N, PROP, FOL 19/36
Uses in economics Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Open questions
1 extend [GE11] beyond n = 8?
2 F apply [GE11] to other axiomatic social choice/utility theory?
e.g. judgment aggregation [LP10]
3 [GE11] can’t express NEU neutrality axiom in MSLSP. Is there
another (tractable) logic that can?
see [ÅHW09; ÅHW11] on developing logics
20/36
Uses in economics Other economic applications
Unique PNE payoffs in 2 agent games [TL11a]
1 express properties, ϕ, of 2 agent games, Γ2×2, in first order logic
e.g. strictly competitive games’ weakly opposed preferences
for all a,a′ ∈ A1 × A2: a %1 a′ ≡ a′ %2 a, an example of
(l1 ∨ l2) ∧ (l3 ∨ l4) (1)
where each lj is either a %i a′ or its negation, ¬ (a %i a′)
known to have unique PNE payoffs
NE (a) ∧ NE (a′) ⊃ (a ∼1 a′) ∧ (a ∼2 a′) (2)
2 manual proof: iff a counterexample to (2) exists for a class of
games defined by a sentence like (1), it exists for a 2 × 2 game
3 generate all 24 × 154 = 810,000 properties, ϕ, of form (1) and all
752 = 5,625 2 × 2 games, Γ2×2
4 for each ϕ, test whether (Γ2×2  ϕ ⊃ (2)) on all Γ2×2
5 for all that do, prune to collect the weakest
complication: logical entailment generally not decidable in FOL
∃, S, N, FOL 21/36
Uses in economics Other economic applications
Unique PNE payoffs in 2 agent games: results
find three types of (weakest) uniqueness conditions with form 1:
1 weakly unilaterally competitive (WUC) [KT92] ⊃ strictly competitive:
proves weakest uniqueness condition of form 1
2 1’s self-interest helps 2, while 2’s hurts 1: ∂u2∂u1 > 0,
∂u1
∂u2
< 0
3 both agents can simultaneously achieve their maximal payoffs
in strict games, Γs ⊂ Γ, in which each profile has a distinct payoff,
(a %i a′ %i a)⇒ (a = a′) ,
so that unique PNE payoffs imply unique PNE:
1 new: weakly unilaterally competitive for player i (if WUC for both,
then WUC)
2 games with dominant strategies
3 a condition that cannot be satisfied in games larger than 3 × 3
[TL11b] manually proves characterization results for two classes
of games suggested by mechanized work
∃, S, N, FOL 22/36
Uses in economics Other economic applications
Open questions
1 F standard uniqueness conditions for PNE include
dominant diagonal in supermodular games [MR90]: complete
lattices, upper semi-continuity, second partial derivatives
unique (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium iff both players have
same number of strategies in support of their BR functions [Kre74]
1 can the above uniqueness conditions be formalized as conjunctions
of the two [TL11a] binary clauses? If not, what is their simplest
formalization?
2 consequences of relaxing requirement that ≥1,≥2 alternate in two
binary clauses?
3 are conjunctions of three binary clauses tractable?
4 how easily derive [TL11a] results beyond n = 2?
23/36
Uses in economics Other economic applications
Reasoning about coalitional games [ÅHW09]
present logics for handling NTU cooperative games
1 coalitional game logic: expressive, but only for finite games
21 line proof that the core is a subset of any stable set
2 modal coalitional game logic: less expressive for finite games, but
can handle infinite games
9 line proof that the core is a subset of any stable set
analyze soundness, completeness, model checking, satisfiability
MOD 24/36
Worked example: pillage games
Pillage games [Jor06]
richer than characteristic, partition function forms
n agents split a unit pie,
∑n
i=1 xi = 1,x ∈ X
dominance relation, K, represented by power function, pi,
increasing in coalitional membership, resources
(WC) C ⊂ C ′ ⊆ I ⇒ pi (C ′,x) ≥ pi (C ,x)∀x ∈ X
(WR) yi ≥ xi∀i ∈ C ⊆ I ⇒ pi (C ,y) ≥ pi (C ,x)
(SR) C , ∅ ⊆ I and yi > xi∀i ∈ C ⇒ pi (C ,y) > pi (C ,x)
often analytically convenient if pi also satisfies
(AN) anonymity: if σ : I → I is a 1:1 onto function
permuting the agent set, i ∈ C ⇔ σ (i) ∈ C ′, and
xi = x′σ(i) then pi (C ,x) = pi (C
′,x′)
x dominates y (written x K y) iff pi (W ,y) > pi (L ,y), where
W ≡ {i|xi > yi} and L ≡ {i|yi > xi}
∃, R, FOL, FOL+SET 25/36
Worked example: pillage games
Lemmas 1 and 2 [KR09]
Lemma
Any power function, pi (C ,x), can be represented by another,
pi′ (C , {xi}i∈C), which depends only on the resource holdings of its
coalition members.
Proof.
Consider arbitrary x,y such that xi = yi∀i ∈ C ⊆ I. Then yi ≥ xi and
xi ≥ yi so that axiom WR requires pi (C ,y) ≥ pi (C ,x) ≥ pi (C ,y). For
this to hold, pi (C ,x) cannot depend on xj for any j < C. 
Lemma
Let x,y ∈ X such that W = {i |yi > xi } = {1} and L = {i |yi < xi } = {2}.
Then, for any power function satisfying axiom AN, y K x ⇔ x1 > x2.
∃, R, FOL, FOL+SET 26/36
Worked example: pillage games
Encoding the lemmas in Theorema [KRW11]
a reasonable rule of thumb when formalizing is that it takes about
one week of full time work to formalize a textbook page. [Wie09]
typed v. untyped?
procedural v. declarative?
compute v. prove [Gon08, p.1385]?
1 Lemma 1
predicate logic (≈ FOL) prover generates proof automatically
even ATP required good knowledge of the proof
10 page human-readable proof for full search
5 page proof for search settings used in [KRW11]
3 page proof when automatically tidied to leave only steps in final
argument (de Bruijn factor ≈ 25?)
2 Lemma 2
set theory (≈ FOL+SET) prover invoked
needed guidance (ITP), partly as permutation is hard [GE09]: we
assert auxiliary lemmas
∃, R, FOL, FOL+SET 27/36
Worked example: pillage games
Open questions
1 we would like to extend pillage games results in [KR09] by
dropping the anonymity axiom (would ease empirical tests)
2 F establish minimal counter-examples to the existence of stable
sets? See [Luc68b; Luc68a; LR82] for the counter-examples of
record.
Finding stable sets involves a new tour de force of
mathematical reasoning for each game or class of
games that is considered. Other than a small number of
very elementary truisms . . . there is no theory, no tools,
certainly no algorithm . . . you just have to slug it out anew
every time. And because stable sets do not always exist,
you cannot even be sure that you are looking for
something that is there. [Aum85]
3 extend [ÅHW09] to TU games?
28/36
Possible next steps in economics Promising problem domains
Mechanism design and auction theory
social choice, mechanism design, cooperative game theory all
structurally similar, rely on axiomatic methods [Suz02]
social choice: given agent types, which SCF satisfy axiom set?
mechanism design: given SCF, can designer recover types from
messages, and implement SCF via a transfer function?
Gibbard-Satterthwaite: [Gib73] proof uses Arrow; [Sat75] is direct
cooperative games
binary relation is K rather than %i
SAT solving (e.g. for model checking) often uses BDD algorithm on
acyclic digraph
auction theory as a subset
model checking important given sums involved (similarly with
matching problems)
in combinatorial auctions, revenue-maximizing design is
NP-complete even with one bidder [CS04]
sophisticated auctions often run ‘in the wild’ with few formal results
Klemperer [Kle10]
how analyze bidders seeking to borrow at up to 5% against £80 mn
strong collateral, at up to 7% against £100 mn weak collateral, and is
willing to pay anything to borrow £40 mn? 29/36
Possible next steps in economics Promising problem domains
Econometrics software
it is not safe to assume that econometric software is accurate [McC09]
package µ α0 α1 β1
X1 -0.00540 0.0096 0.142 0.821
X2 -0.00608 0.0098 0.144 0.818
X3 -0.00624 0.0108 0.153 0.806
X4 -0.00619 0.0108 0.152 0.806
X5 -0.00613 0.0107 0.153 0.806
X6 -0.00919 0.0098 0.144 0.818
X7 -0.00619 0.0108 0.153 0.806
GARCH estimates pre-FCP benchmark [McC09]
user errors: [LL82] corrects [Fel74]; [FG05] corrects [DL01]
best practice seems to be
1 identify stable algorithms, including by functional testing on certified
value (à la NIST datasets)
2 formally prove that they are correctly encoded (à la Formal Linear
Algebra Methods Environment [Gun+01; Bie+05])
[McC10] advocates using open-source R rather than a black-box30/36
Possible next steps in economics Promising problem domains
Finance and risk management
There is no faster way for a trading firm to destroy itself than
to deploy a piece of trading software that makes a bad
decision over and over in a tight loop. [Min11]
1 finance second largest use domain, after transport [Woo+09]
largely model checking of transactions processing software in
distributed domains
e.g. ϕ include: “no value is created”, “all value is accounted for”
2 functional programming increasingly used in finance
harder to write, but ‘more correct’ once written
as avoids ‘side effects’ (only returns result; doesn’t alter global
variables, read or write data, . . . ) only need to verify routines once
develops from 1930s’ formal system, Church’s λ-calculus
theorem provers like Coq, HOL Light written in OCaml
R, Mathematica support functional programming
Credit Suisse “develops and maintains mathematical models to
manage derivatives trading and analyze investment portfolios” in F#
31/36
Possible next steps in economics Promising problem domains
Is Basel’s market risk management meaningful?
[JP Morgan] adopted a new VAR model . . . only to switch back
. . . after losses spiralled – the old model showed the unit’s $129
million average [Q1] VAR . . . was almost twice as high as the $67
million the bank had publicly reported. . . .
But a former senior regulator at the OCC says . . . “The OCC
. . . validates the framework by which the institutions construct and
validate their own models . . . it is not possible to dig deeply into
each model.” [Car12b]
“The cynical view is that the [traders] figure out the weaknesses
in the new VAR model, and put on positions that do not result in
increased modelled risks,” says Christopher Finger . . . at MSCI . . .
“The new VAR model was data-mined to produce the desired
number of breaches in the past, and . . . halved the VAR relative to
the old model . . . ” says the chief risk officer at one hedge fund. . . .
A senior risk manager at a US bank puts it more bluntly: “This
isn’t because of a modelling problem . . . This was a fundamental
failure of high-level risk management” [Car12a]
32/36
Possible next steps in economics Promising problem domains
Open questions
1 which logics are capable of encoding product-mix auction bids
[Kle10]?
2 encode coherent [Art+99] and spectral [Ace02] risk axioms,
results?
3 connect finance literature on axiomatic risk management [Art+99;
Ace02] to utility theory’s axiomatisations of ambiguity [ES10]
4 how to check large internal VaR models?
hedge funds’ operational risk measures currently seem related to
disclosure statements [Bro+08; Bro+09]
ditto algo trading models: flash crashes, floating point
representation [Har06]
33/36
Possible next steps in economics A source of metrics?
A metric for bounded rationality
have considered MR as a tool for solving problems
but may also provide a variety of metrics for bounded rationality
thus, alternative to existing approaches
1 finite automata
can’t encode strategies for which might need to count infinitely high
e.g. “punish nth deviation for n periods” [Rub98]
2 level-k reasoning [CCGIrt]
L0 as naïve play, L1 as BR to L0, . . . , Ln+1 as BR to Ln . . .
best response mapping may be arbitrarily complex, but reasoner
doesn’t know induction
thus, Bertrand duopoly, traveler’s dilemma: level-k converges very
slowly
by contrast, higher order logic allows induction over the natural
numbers, allowing modeling of important computational processes
34/36
Resources for economists
ForMaRE: Formal Mathematical Reasoning in
Economics
A hub for MR/ATP within economics, including:
1 a wiki containing
1 project pages for all known applications of MR/ATP to economics,
including links to their code
2 a list of 100 theorems in economics, containing (so far) 50
theorems, of which 7 have been formalized
2 a discussion list
Other general MR/ATP resources include:
1 Sutcliffe and Suttner’s TPTP Problem Library for Automated
Theorem Proving
CADE ATP System Competition (CASC)
2 Verified Software Repository: presently not well developed
3 Wiedijk√
2 is irrational in 17 different provers
reciprocal of power series challenge at ICMS 2006, inc. demo
videos for Isabelle, HOL Light, Mizar, ProofPower, Coq; re-worked
by Felix Breuer 35/36
Conclusions
1 MR has solved open problems in specific areas of mathematics
2 exploiting these powerful techniques will require new skills
most powerful mechanized/formal results may require manually
establishing new lemmas, theorems
3 if inappropriately applied, cumbersome and almost useless
4 MR broader than ‘just’ theorem proving: F, H, ∃, C, S, N, R
5 ITP more successful, more broadly applicable than ATP
ATP like a driverless car; ITP helps the driver
6 Moore’s law may only add a ply or two to search depth in the near
future: thus, not explosive progress in theorem proving since 1997
7 recent surge of serious effort within computer science to apply
formal methods to economics, largely outside our awareness
36/36
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Glossary I
automated reasoning
automated theorem proving
calculus of inductive constructions [VLO06]
interactive theorem proving (proof assistant; human directed)
infix notation
logic
first order (predicate)
many sorted
second order
higher order
modal “the logic to reason about binary relations” [ÅHW11]
propositional
machine learning
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Glossary II
mathematical knowledge management
mechanized reasoning
model checker given a model, Γ, and a property, ϕ, does Γ have
property ϕ (i.e. Γ  ϕ)?
model theory
proof checker
quantifier elimination
SAT solver
semantic v syntactic
semantic web
set theory
simply typed λ-calculus HOL Light is built on top of this
situation calculus
skolemization
temporal calculus
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Robbins’ conjecture with two atoms, E = {a,b}
X Y X Y X ∨ Y X ∨ Y X ∨ Y X ∨ Y HUN ROB
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 a 1 b 1 1 b b 0 0
0 b 1 a 1 1 a a 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
a 0 b 1 b 1 b 1 a a
a a b b 1 b b 1 a a
a b b a b 1 0 a a a
a 1 b 0 1 b 0 a a a
b 0 a 1 a 1 a 1 b b
b a a b a 1 0 b b b
b b a a 1 a a 1 b b
b 1 a 0 1 a 0 b b b
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 a 0 b a b 0 1 1 1
1 b 0 a b a 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Robbins
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Main software libraries
Mizar
Mizar Mathematical Library (MML) has formalized 49,000 theorems
declarative proof mode resembles human mathematics: describes
steps, rather than tactics (procedural)
outputs to the Journal of Formalized Mathematics
HOL Light [Har12]
9,724 named formal theorems (including trivial, e.g. pi > 0)
built-in first order theorem prover, MESON
HOL Light Euclidean library developed out of FlysPecK contains
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, Stone-Weierstrass, Tietze extension
theorem, second mean value theorem for integrals, power series for
real and complex transcendental functions, . . . Generally does not
reach beyond Rn to arbitrary Banach, Hilbert spaces
lacks results in algebraic topology, differential forms, differential
manifolds
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Other encodings of UN, IIA and ND
First order logic [TL09] [q.v. GE09]
∀a,b , s. [∀x p (x ,a,b , s)] ⊃ w (a,b , s) (UN)
∀a,b , s1, s2. [∀x .p (x ,a,b , s1) ≡ p (x ,a,b , s2)] ⊃ [w (a,b , s1) ≡ w (a,b , s2)] (IIA)
¬∃x∀s,a,b .p (x ,a,b , s) ≡ w (a,b , s) (ND)
Higher order logic [Nip09]
If ∀i.Pia < Pib then FPa < FPb (UN)
If ∀i.Pia < Pib ↔ P ′ia < P ′ib then FPa < FPb ↔ FP ′a < FP ′b (IIA)
Modal logic [ÅHW11]
 ((1 ∧ · · · ∧ n)→ σ) (UN)

∧
 ((o ∧ σ)→  (o → σ)) (IIA)∧
i∈N
♦¬ (σ↔ i) (ND)
Arrow by induction
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